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THE STAYING POWER  OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 
ABSTRACT 
This paper documents  the organizational status  over time of 
183  large leveraged  buyouts  (LBO5)  completed  between 1979  and 
1986.  As  of  August  1990,  63%  of the LaOs are privately  owned, 
14%  are  independent public companies,  and  23% are  owned  by other 
public companies  As  time  since the LaO  increases,  the 
percentage  of LEOn that have returned to public ownership 
increases.  The  (unconditional)  median time LnOs remain private 
equals 6.70 years.  This evidence suggests that the majority of 
LEO organizations are neither short-lived nor pennanent.  In 
addition  the moderate  fraction of LBO5 assets owned by other 
(potentially related) companies implies that asset sales play a 
role in,  but are not the primarily force motivating LEO 
transactions. 
Steven  Kaplan 
Graduate School  of Business 
University of Chicago 
1101 East  58th St. 
Chicago,  IL  60637 L  Introduction 
In the 1980s,  an unprecedented number of public corporations and their divisions 
went private in leveraged  buyout transactions (LBOs).  LBO activity  increased from $1.4 
billion in 1979 to $77 billion  in 1988.1  LBOs are typically characterized  by debt to total 
capital ratios exceeding 85%, significant equity ownership by management,  and (in the case 
of public  company LBOs) premiums to public shareholders  exceeding 40%.  In addition to 
including management, the buyout investor group often is led by a LBO sponsor or promoter 
that structures the transaction, owns or controls the majority of the company's  equity, and 
controls the board of directors. 
In spite of the large transaction volume, L130s remain poorly understood.  In 
particular, there is a healthy debate concerning  the stability  of the LBO organization  which, 
in turn, has implications  for the possible  sources  of value  in LBO transactions.2  Jensen 
(1989) argues that LBO organizations  solve the free cash flow problem  faced by companies 
in low growth industries.  A large portion of the wealth increases in LBO transactions are 
directly attributable to the incentives  LilOs provide to pay out free cash  flow.  These 
incentives  include large debt-service  payments, large equity stakes for managers,  and often 
the presence of an LBO sponsor -- labelled  an acLive  investor by -Jensen --who monitors and 
controls the management team.  AlLhough public companies (and their managers) are 
capable of obtaining  the same benefits,  they rarely have the incentive to do so.  In low- 
growth  businesses,  therefore, Jensen argues the public  corporation is inferior as an 
organizational  form to Lhe L130 organization. 
Rappaport (1990) disagrees that the LBO organization is superior to the public 
corporation. I-ic argues that the discipline  of debt and concentrated ownership  imposes costs 
•  of inflexibility to competition and change.  As a resulL.  he claims  Lhat buyouts are inherently 
See Jensen (1989). Figures are in 1988 dollars. 
See Kaplan  (1989a and 1989b)  for a discussion  of and evidence  on sources of value in 
management buyouts  of public companies. 2 
Lransitory organizations.  The typical  active investor invests funds provided by outside 
investors who expect to be repaid in fwe to ten years.  Rappaport argues that LBO firm 
equity will be sold to the public in an initial public offering (IPO), or sold to a public 
company in a related business to meet this repayment constraint. 
In their study of hostile takeovers, Bhagat, Shieffer and Vishny  (1990) also 
question the importance of incentive-intensive  organizations,  They find that only 20% of the 
assets involved in hostile takeovers are owned by LRO organizations two to three years later. 
Alternatively,  they find that 72% of the assets end up owned  by corporations with similar 
assets -- related  or strategic buyers. They conclude  that raiders and LBO promoLers  serve 
largely as brokers rather than operators. 
Finally, Kaplan  (1989a)  and Schipper  and Smith (1982) consider the importance of 
taxes as a sour of  value in management buyouts.  The value of tax benefits depends largely 
on the value of the tax deductibility  of debt.  This, in turn, depends on the length of time the 
increased debt is maintained. Tax benefits of debt are more valuable if the debt is 
permanent than if it is paid off  within two or three years of the buyout. 
Under Jensen's view that LBO incentives are a critical source of value,  LBOs 
should remain private for an unspecified,  but significant period of time.  To the extent that 
LBOs  do subsequently  go public, Jensen's view suggests that debt levels will remain high and 
equity will still be largely held by managers  and active investors.  The maintenance of high 
debt levels would also be consistent  with an important role for lax benefits. 
In contrast,  Rappaport expects LBOs,  needing the flexibility offered by access to 
public  markets,  will return to public  ownership  relatively  quickly.  The arguments and results 
of Bhagat et at. suggest that some of these LBOs  will return to public ownership as divisions 
of related or strategic  buyers. 
In this paper, I consider the evidence for the Jensen and Rappaport views of LBO 3 
organizations. I esamine the post-buyout organizational form of 183 large LBOs completed 
between  1979 and 1986 from the time of their completion through August 199ft As of 
August 1990, 63% of the LBO companies  are privately owned,  14%  are publicly owned  and 
still independent, while 23% have been purchased  by publicly owned U.S. or foreign 
companies. The 63% reflects the current organizational status  of the LBO company, 
ignoring the current organizational form of assets sold (and purchased) after the buyout. 
The percentage of  LEO assets privately owned changes only slightly, decreasing to 60%, 
when assets sold (but not assets purchased) are considered. 
The 63% and 60% figures  given above are "reduced form" percentages in that they 
•  measure  the current organizational  status  of the LilO  assets, ignoring the path taken to 
reach that status.  LBOs private as of August 1990 include those that return to private 
ownership  after  first having returned to public ownership. Almost 45%  of the 162 LEOs 
whose status can be identified through  the entire period return to public ownership at some 
point after the buyout.  The median time -- conditional on returning public -- these 
companies  remain private is only 243 years.  However, the unconditional estimate of the 
median time private equals 6.70 years.  The  likelihood that a LEO returns to public 
ownership is small in the first year after the LEO and appeats to be larger and constant 
thereafter. 
Overall, this evidence  suggests that the typical buyout is neither short-lived,  nor 
permanent. Consistent with the  Rappaport  model,  the large  fraction  of LBOs that return to 
public ownership  suggests that the LEO  is often a transitory organizational form, bridging 
periods of public  ownership. 
Alternatively, consistent with the Jensen model  and the importance ot the 
incentive-intensive  organization,  a substantial fraction of LEO assets are private and still 
highly leveraged  many  years after the LI3Os.  In addition, many of the independent public 
companies  appear to be hybrid organizations,  retaining some of the characteristica  of the LBO organization. Equity  ownership  by managers  and buyout investors  exceeds 40% and 
debt ratios appear higher than pre-buyotlL  levels in the LBOs that are currently independent 
public companies.  These results  are also consistent  with an important role for  tax  benefits. 
The results also imply a moderate,  but not primasy role for asset sales to strategic 
buyers in LBOs.  Almost 32%  of the original LBO  assets are owned  by companies  with other 
operating assets.  Because  some of these  buyers might be in unrelated businesses and 
because asset purchases  are not counted,  32% is an upper bound on the percentage  of assets 
that can be owned by strategic buyers. This is a lower percentage  than the 72% reported by 
Bhagat et at. for three years after hostile takeovers,  and somewhat  lower than the 43% 
reported for the 7 LBOs in their sample.  In contrast to their findings for  hostile takeovers, 
the results for LBOs in this paper are consistent  with incentives  playing a role in explaining 
value increases. 
The paper proceeds  as follows.  Section 2 describes  the  sample and the data 
collection  process.  Section 3 presents  a detailed analysis of the private /  public 
organizational status of the LBOs  over time.  Section 4 describes  other current 
characteristics of the LBOs.  Section  5 examines the cross-sectional  determinants of 
organizational status and section 6 concludes. 
2.  Sample  and Data. 
2-1  Sample. 
The sample includes those tronsactions identified as leveraged  buyouts by 
Securities Data Corporation (SDC) or Morgan Stantey  & Company between 1979 and 1986. 
I exclude  transactions completed after  1986 to ensure  at least 3.67 years  for changes in 
organizational form to occur.  To increase  the likelihood of identifying a companys current 
organizational status,  I include only those  buyouts with a transaction value greater than $100 
million.  These criteria  generate  a sample  of 183 companies.  Column A of table 1 shows  the 5 
number of Lransactions  completed over time. 
These  sample  buyouls  were valued at $83.0 billion when they were completed. 
Over the same period, W.T. Grimm's Mergerstat Review reports $92.2 billion in going 
private and unit management  buyout transactions. This sample,  therefore, includes a large 
fraction of the dollar value of transactions  completed between  1979 and 1986. 
2.2  Post-Buvout Information. 
I obtained post-buyout infonnation on these companies from Lotus' Datcxt (public 
and private) databases, Wall Street Journal articles from the year the LBO was  compleLed 
through August 1990 and, when available, financial reports tiled with the SEC.  Whenever 
possible, the corporate treasurer or controller of each sample company  was called  to confirm 
the information.  The post-buyout  information includes and the telephone interviews 
attempted to confirm the following:  1) the date and dollar  value of the original transaction; 
2)11 any assets had been sold since the LBO and if  so the assets sold, their dollar value, the 
acquirer. and the organizational form of the acqutrer  and 3) the current ownership status / 
organizational form of the company. 
3.  Post-buvout status  - private or public assets? 
3.1  Current organizational siatus .- LBO  company. 
Table 1  presents  the current status of the 183 buyoul companies  by year of LBO. 
These companies  are classified  into one of four basic categories: (1) unidentified;  (2) 
liquidated; (3) still privately owned (including companies  in Chapter 11); or (4) publicly 
owned.  Some post-buyout information is available for  171 of the 183 companies.  The 
remaining 12 could not be identified; presumably,  they have  either changed  their names, 
been sold, or gone bankrupt.  At most, therefore, the analysis in the rest of the paper uses 
these  171 companies. An additional 9 companies  were  ultimately liquidated or sold off in 6 
more than one piece, and, therefore, have  an ambiguous  current organizational form.  The 
remaining 162 companies  have an August 1990 organizational  form that I could identi,.  At 
a minimum, the analysis  that follows uses these 162 companies. 
As of  August 1990, 63.0% (or 102) of the 161 LBOs of known status are still 
privately owned. The remaining 37.0% (or 60) are publicly owned -- 13,6%  (or 22) are 
independent public companies  while 23.5% (or 32) are owned  by other public companies. 
The 63.0% result pertains to all of the LOGs in the sample.  LOOt completed at the end of 
1986 have had as liLtIe as 3.67  years  to change organizational forms since  the buyout 
compared to over 11  years for LOGs completed in 1979.  If LBOs are transitory 
organizations  with uncertain lives, one would ccpect  earlier LBOs to be less likely to be 
privately owned.  The pattern in table 1  is roughly consistent  with this.  Only 46,3% of LObs 
completed by 1983 are still privately owned  compared  to almost 68.6% of LOGs completed 
after 1923.  However, the pattern is by no means monotonic.  Fewer than 31% of  the  LOGs 
completed in 1983 are still private compared to almost 55% of those completed in 1981. 
3.2  Current organizational status -- all assets. 
The previous results reflect the current organizational status of the LOG company. 
They would be misleading if many  of the buyout companies  make large divestitures and sell 
the divested assets to public companies.  To address this possibility, I calculate the fraction 
of a company's assets that are private as of August 1990.  For each sample  LOG, I determine 
the current organizational form of all of  that  company's  assets.  If no assets have been sold, 
the fraction of a company's  assets that are private is determined by its current organizational 
status.  For LOOs which have sold assets, the fnction of assets still private is calculated as 
the value weighted avenge of the organizational forms of the sold and retained assets.  In 
the few cases the LOG company  has been liquidated, the sale prices of the different assets 
are used as  weights. In those  cases in which some assets are not sold (and, therefore, cannot be valued), accounting numbers are used as weights.  When  they can  be calculated,  the 
operating  income before interest, depreciation,  and taxes of the different pieces are used as 
weights.  Book  assets are used if  operating income  is not available, and, finally, sales, if book 
assets are not available.  In all cases, the weighs are based on the assets held by the LBO at 
the time it went priVate. 
Table 2  shows that the adjustment for asset sales decreases  the fraction of  assets 
privately owned slightly  -- from 63.0%  to 60.1%.  The pattern over time is similar to that for 
the current organizational form of the LBOs.  The number of  LBOs that contribute to this 
table increases  to 166 because the assets of four of the liquidated companies  can  be tnce± 
It is worth adding that the 60.1% result should be considered a lower bound on 
the assets private because it does not adjust for asset purchases  by the private  companies.  If 
asset sales to public entities are considered public, subsequent  asset purchases  by the private 
companies  could be considered to be private. 
3.3  Oreanizational status  by year after LBO. 
Instead of presenting the fraction of  LBOs that are private by year of 120 
completion, table 3 presents  the fraction of LBOs that are private by year after the LBO. 
This is analogous  to considering organizational status in event time.  This table uses all 171 
of the LBOs for which data are available.  The nine companies  that  are subsequently 
liquidated are included for  years in which  their organizational forms are unambiguous. 
From year 1 to year 8 after the buyout, the fraction of LBOs that are privately 
owned decreases monotonically  from 97.1% to 52.2%.  The fraction increases  in years 9 and 
10, but those increases  are based on a small number of observations. 
Tables 1-3 show that LBOs return to public  ownership at widely varying  times. 
Almost  25% of the LBOs are publicly  owned three years after the bu out, rising to almost 8 
50% by eight years after the buyoot.  This pattern suggests that the typical buyout is not 
short-lived  nor is it permanent. 
4. 
3.4  Estimates of time spent private. 
$ 
The percentages  given above are  reduced form  percentages in that they measure 
the current organizational status of the LBO assets.  They do not distinguish  between  (1) 
LBOs  still private from the original  LBO and (2) LBOs that have gone private a second time 
after returning to public ownership  Table 4 presents the time pattern relative to the year of 
buyout completion  by which LEOs  returned to public ownership. Almost 45% -- 72 of 162 - 
- of  the  LBOs whose status can be identified  through the entire period return to public 
ownership at some point after the buyout.  Forty-one of these companies return public by 
issuing equity to public shareholders. The remaining thir1yone companies  are purchased by 
publicly owned companies  -- both domestic and foreign.  The median (avenge) time  -- 
conditional  on returning public -- these  companies stayed private is only 2.63 (2.83) years. 
This is similar to the 2-42 median  (2.89 average)  time spent under private ownership  by the 
72 firms in Muscarella  and Vetsuvpens (1990).  The differences between the 45% result in 
this section and the smaller percentage in the previous ones reflect the fact that 12 of the 72 
companies that return to public  ownership  subsequently  go private again.  Nine of these 12 
are independent public companies that complete a second LEO.  The remaining three  are 
owned by other public companies that subsequently  go private.  The 12 companies remain 
public  a median (avenge) of 2.46 (2.34)  years before going private again. 
If all the LBOs in the sample  had returned to public  ownership  at a known time  it 
would  be possible to calculate the unconditional  median  (and  average)  time private directly. 
As table 4 shows,  however, the majority of LBOs in this sample are private as of August 
1990 and must be considered censored observations.  LBOs  are censored in year i after the 
LEO if they are still private as of August 1990, but were completed between 1-1 and i years 9 
before August 1990. 
It is possible to use the information about returns to public  ownership  and 
censored  observations  to  estimate  the distribution  of times it takes an LBO to return  to 
public ownership. The product limit or Kaplan-Meier estimate of the  survivor function  is: 
S(t)  =  ir...1 (l-d/n) 
where dt is the number of LAOs  that return public at t  and nt is the number of  LBOs that 
have (1) not yet returned public prior to tk and (2) were  completed at least t  years before. 
These  estimates  can be considered maximum likelihood estimates  [See chapter 1 of 
Kalb(leisch and Prentice (1980)].  The cumulative failure rate equals  1  - S(t), where the 
cumulative failure rate is equivalent to the cumulative distribution  function of the probability 
of returning to public ownership. 
Table 4 shows that the median survival time or time to public ownership is 
between 6 and 7  years after the LAO.  The estimated  median time is 6.70 years.  If the last 
observation were  not censored  and the oldest LBO  returned public in September  1990, the 
estimated mean would equal 6.79 years.  Because  the last observation is censored, this 
estimated mean is clearly downward biased.  The estimated standard  error using the 6.79 
year mean is 0.37. 
'The data used to  construct table 4 can  also be used to  estimale the  relation 
between the likelihood of returning public and time.  This relation is known as the duration 
•  dependence. Duration  dependence  is positive (negative) if  the probability a LAO company 
-w 
returns to public ownership during the jth period, conditional on being private at the 
•  beginning of the ith period, increases  (decreases)  over time. 
An examination of duration dependence  is interesting because it provides 
important information on the process by  which LAOs return to public ownership. A flnding 
of negative duration dependence  would  imply that LBOs remaining private for some time 10 
become  increasingly likely to remain private in the future.  This could result if initial 
uncertainty about the benefits of private ownership are resolved  over  time.  Companies that 
4  find-the benefits of private ownership  to be large become increasingly  less likely to return to 
public ownership.  Negative duration dependence  would  be consistent  with permanence for 
some LBOs. 
Alternatively,  negative  duration dependence  could also reflect the existence of 
unobserved heterogeneity. For example, if there were two different LBO types -- short-term 
information-based  LBOs and longer-term incentive-based  LBOS -- both  with constant hazard 
rates,  initially, a random L130's likelihood  of returning  public  (conditional  on being private) 
wilt be a weighted average of the number of the two types in the sample.  Over time, 
however, the short-term LBOs  will return to public ownership  and only long-term  LBOs will 
remain. As a result, estimated duration dependence  will be negative.  However, the longer- 
term LBOs will continue to return to public ownership at their same constant rate. 
Negative  duration dependence, therefore  would be consistent  with permanence for 
some LBOs, but could also indicate the presence of unobserved  heterogeneity.  In contrast, 
positive and no duration dependence  boLh would imply that L130s return to public ownership 
at some constanL or increasing  rate.3 
Although more sophisticated  methods exist, the simplest  way to study duration 
dependence is to estimate a logit regrsion model.4  The hazard rate in this analysis is the 
probability that a LBO company returns to public ownership in the ith year after the LBO, 
given that the LBO was still private at the beginning of the P year. If  an LBO has fewer 
than i complete years of post-LBO operations, that P company-year  is not counted as an 
observation. Independent  variables  can be created for each company-year.  To examine 
See Kiefer (1988), p.67l-2, for a clear discussion of  these issues. 
See Allison  (1984), Kalbfleisch  and Prentice (1980), or }Ciefer (1988).  The results using  the togit model  are qualitatively  identical to those obtained using hazard model estimates. 11 
duration dependence,  dummy variables are assigned for  each company-year  that equal one if 
the company-year  is the ith post-LEO  year and zero  otherwise.  In addition to potential 
duration  effects,  year effects can aist.  For erample, LBOs completed in 1983 may have 
been  different  from LBOs  completed in 1986.  Aca'rdingly, a set of  dummy variables are 
assigned  to each company-year  based on the year the LEO was completed.5 The company- 
years are then pooled and the usual logit regression  model is estimated on the resulting 
sample. 
Table 5 presents the logit model estimates,  Regression  1  indicates that  the 
estimated probability of returning public (conditional on being private) is lowest  in the first 
post-buyout year  -- the coefficients imply the probability is 3.7%.  The implied probability 
peaks in the fourth  year at 13.9%  and drops slightly thereafter.  This suggests  positive 
duration dependence  followed by slightly negative duration dependence. 
Regression  2 replaces the variables for the 2nd year through the 9th year and aftcr 
with one variable for the second year and after.  The likelihood ratio test statistic of tO is 
not significant (chi-square distribution with 7 degrees of freedom).  The data, therefore, do 
not reject the hypothesis that after the first year, the LEO  companies  are equally likely to 
return  to public ownership. The coefficients imply that the probability of returning public in 
any year  after the  fIrst year is 11,9% while the probability of  returning in the first year is 
only 3.7%. 
Regression  3 retains the 2nd year and after variable, but adds variables indicating 
the LEO completion year.  The completion year variable should be compared to LBOs 
completed in 1986.  Regression  3 indicates that only LBOs completed in 1983 are 
significantly more likely to return to public ownership in a given  year than are LBOs 
The  results are similar when the LEO  completion year dummies are replaced by dummy 
variables for each observaLion  year.  For ccample,  the dummy variable for 1988 equals one if 
the company-year  ends in 1988, and 0 otherwise.  This provides an alternative control for  year 
effects. 12 
completed in other years.  Given the data limitations of this sample,  it is difficult to know 
why deals completed in 1983 are different.  Regression  3 also shows that controlling for the 
S 
completion year has only a minor effect on the duration dependence  of returning public. 
* 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that LBOs return to public ownership at 
a slow, but steady rate.  Because  the data do not exhibit negative duration dependence,  the 
results are consistent with one underlying hazard  function (for one type of LBO) determining 
the distribution  of time to return to public ownership.  Again, this implies that LBO  are 
neither short-lived nor permanent organizational forms. 
4.  Current LBO characteristics. 
The analysis  to this point  distinguishes  between privately and publicly owned 
assets.  It does not describe whether LBO companies  and assets are still independently 
owned  or have been purchased  by other companies.  In addition, the private / public 
dichotomy does  not necessarily  imply large differences in post-buyout leverage  or equity 
ownership. This section presents  evidence  on post-buyout independence,  leverage,  and equity 
ownership. 
4.1  Independent or strategic assets? 
As mentioned earlier, Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) question the impedance 
of incentive-intensive organizations  in hostile takeovers.  They find that only 20% of the 
assets involved in hostile takeovers  are owned by LEO organizations two to three years later. 
Alternatively,  they  find that 72% of the assets end up owned  by corporations with similar 
assets —  related or strategic buyers.  In their sample, raiders and LBOs serve largely as 
broken rather than operators.  They conclude that shareholder gains in hostile takeovers 
may be explained by efficiency gains from joint operations,  but also by gains from market 13 
power or from overpayment by the strategic buyers. 
Table 6 distinguishes LEO companies  in my sample by their current private or 
public status and by whether they are currently independent or owned by another company. 
LEO companies  which are releveraged by a new LEO investor  group are considered to be 
independently  owned,  Of the 162 LBOs I can classi4',  45 or  27.8% are owned by companies 
with other operating  assets. Because  some of the purchasers  of the LBOs might be in 
unrelated businesses, 27.8% is an upper bound on the percentage of LBO companies that 
can be owned by strategic buyers.  The percentage  of LEOs owned  by other companies is 
smallest for LEGs completed in 1986,  Excluding LBOs  completed in 1986, the percentage 
increases  to 35%. 
Table  7 presents an analysis similar to that in table 2 by considering  the current 
independent / non-independent  status of  all LEO company assets, including assets divested 
by the LEO company.  An average of 31.8% of the assets for the 165 LEOs I can classify are 
owned  by companies  with other operating assets.  Excluding LEOs completed in 1986, the 
percentage increases  to 39%. 
These results imply a moderate role for asset sales to strategic buyers in LBOs. 
Only 31.8% of the original  LEO assets and 27.8% of the LBO companies are owned by 
companies  with other operating assets at least 3.67 years after the buyout.  The percentages 
owned  by companies  in the same industry are undoubtedly  smaller.  These are lower 
percentages  than the 72% reported by Ehagat et al. for three  years after hostile takeovers, 
and than the 43% reported for the 7 LBOs in their sample. 
It is possible that asset sales are more important for LBOs motivated by hostile 
prsure.  Accordingly,  I divide  the sample  into hostile  and friendly l2Os.  LEOs  are 
considered hostile  if:  (1) the LBO receives or is a response to a hostile takeover bid;  (2) 
the LEO announcement  follows the purchase of at least 5% of the LEO company equity by 
a hostile party in the prior six months;  or (3) the LEO is a division of a company that 14 
satisfies  the hostile definitions in (1) and (2).  For the 42 LBOs classified  as hostile, 31.6% 
of the assets are owned by companies  with other operating assets;  the percentage is 31.5% 
for the 121 LBOs classified  as friendly.6  The atent of asset sales to strategic buyers, 
4 
therefore,  is not related to the actual presence of hostile pressure. (It is possible, but not 
testable,  that this result would change  if it were possible to measure unobserved,  but 
perceived  hostile pressure.) 
In contrast to the results in Shagat et al. for hostile takeovers, the results for this 
sample of LBOs are consistent with the view that incentives  play a role in explaining the 
gains in LB  Os. 
4.2  Is high leverage  maintained? 
One of the distinguishing  characteristics  of a LBO is high leverage.  Kaplan 
(1989b) reports a median debt to total capital ratio of 87.8% at buyout completion for 
management buyouts announced between  1979 and 1985.  This contrasts with a debt to total 
capital ratio of only 18,8% before the buyout. LBOs that remain private need  not retain 
their high  leverage.  Similarly, LEOs that return to public  ownership do not necessarily 
eliminate their debt,  This section considers the post-buyout capital structure, when available. 
of the sample LBOs at the end of fiscal year 1989 (the last fiscal year end with such data). 
I measure post-buyout  capital structure or leverage  in three ways.  The first 
measure is the book value of total debt (short-term and long-term)  as a fraction of the book 
value of total capital where total capital is the sum of total debt, preferred stock,  common 
equity.  The second measure is the book value of total debt as a fraction of the LEO 
transaction value reported by SDC or Morgan  Stanley.  The third  measure is the ratio of 
6  The hostile-friendly  status of two LBOs  is ambiguous. 15 
interest expense  to operating  income  before interest, depreciation, and taxes in fiscal year 
1989. 
Capital  structure  data for the 1989 fiscal year are publicly available  for  21 of the 
22 LBOs that are independent public companies  as of August 1990.  Such data are available 
for only 33 of the 95 privately owned LBOs. Although  the relatively  small fraction of data 
for privately owned LBOs leaves open the possibility  of a  post selection bias, the direction 
of Lhat bias is not clear. 
Panel A of table 8 shows that the 33 privately owned and independent LBOs 
maintain  high  levels of debt after the buyout. These companies  have a median ratio of total 
debt to total  capital is 0.978 at the end of fiscal year 1989.  Total debt for these companies is 
91% of the LBO transaction  value.  These values are similar to those found by Kaplan 
(1989b) at the time LBOs are completed.  The median  ratio of interest expense to operating 
income of 0.719 also seems high.  Bernanke, Campbell  and Whited (1990) find a median 
ratio of interest expense  to cash  flow of  0.219 in 1988 for all COMPUSTAT  firms.  Kaplan 
and Stein (1991)  find that projected post-buyout  interest  expense  to pre-buyout operating 
income  is 0.833 for 124 larger management  buyouts in the 1980s. 
The 21  publicly owned and independent LBOs maintain a substantial amount of 
debt, but less than the privately owned LBOs.  The median ratio of total debt to total capital 
is 0.663, while total debt is 58.8% of the LBO transaction  value.  The debt levels for the 
public LBOs are higher than the pre-buyout levels of 18.8% reported by Kaplan (1989b). 
Interest expense to operating  income appears to fall more sharply.  The ratio of 0.276 
exceeds the median 0.219 found by Bernanke et at., but is much lower than the 0.833 found 
by Kaplan and Stein. 
As the previous section indicates,  almost 28% of  the LBO companies  have been 
purchased by other companies.  Leverage  data for the 1989 fiscal year are publicly available 
for 33 of these companies.  Panel B of table 8 shows Lhat the median  ratios of debt to total 16 
capital and interest expense to  operating  income for the four private LBO  purchasers  are 
similar to those of the private and independent LBOs.  The ratios for the 29 public LBO 
purchasers  are slightly less than, but similar to those for the independent public LBOs. 
I 
The results in this section suggest  that privately owned LBOs, both independent 
and purchased. maintain  debt levels similar to the levels when the LBO was  completed.  In 
contrast, publicly owned LBOs, both independent  and purchased,  maintain debt levels  lower 
than the initial L3O  levels,  but higher than pre-buyout levels and median public company 
levels.  These results seem consistent both with the Jensen incentive view and with the tax 
view. 
4.3  Is high equity  ownershio  maintained? 
Another distinguishing characteristic of L130s  is concentrated equity ownership. 
Management  and the LBO  promoter typically own or control  100%  of the post-buyout 
equity.  According to the Jensen  view,  the concentrated equity ownership provides strong 
incentives for  managers  and the LBO promoter to maximize shareholder  value.  Almost  by 
definition, LBOs which remain privately owned retain their concentrated equity ownership 
structure.  It is an empirical question whether LUOs that return to public ownership, either 
as independent companies  or as purchases of other companies,  are still characterize  by 
concentrated equity ownership. 
Stock ownership data are available for  17 of the 21 independent public LBOs for 
fiscal year 1989.  As panel  A of table 8 indicates,  buyout sponsors  and management  investors 
hold a median of 40.0% (and an avenge of 42.6%) of post-IPO equity tn these 17 
companies. McConnell and Servaes (forthcoming) examine over 1000 non-financial 
companies  tracked by the Value Line Investment Survey in 1986 and find a median insider 
ownership of 5.0% (and an avenge of 11.8%). The much larger insider ownership 17 
percentages of post-IPO equity suggest that significant incentives to maximize shareholder 
value are still present in LBOs that return public, but remain independent. 
Stock ownership data are also available for 29 of the public purchasers  of  LEOs 
for fiscal year 1989.  Insiders own a median of  5.7% (and  an avenge of 16.2%) of the equity 
in these companies.  These owiership  percentages are slightly higher than, but not 
significantly different  from the cortponding  percentages  in McConnell nnd Servaes. 
Independent LBO purchasers,  therefore, do not appear to be characterized  by particularly 
concentrated equity ownership. 
5.  Cross-sectional  determinants of public / private status. 
5.1  The importance of active  investors, 
Although Jensen's  (1989) arguments  are relevant for all LBOs. his primary focus is 
on active investors and LEO  Associations. The primary examples  of these organizations  are 
LBO partnerships  and the merchant banking divisions of investment  banks  and commercial 
banks.  Accordingly,  I classify the sample LilOs as involving one of three types of buyout 
investors:  LEO partnership,  merchant bank division,  and other.  LEO  partnerships include 
Adler Shaykin,  Clayton Dubilier, Forstmann Little, Gibbons Green, Hicks & Haas, Kelso, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Riordan Freeman, Thomas Lee, Warburg hocus, and Wesray. 
Merchant banking divisions include Allen & Company,  Bankers Trust, Citicorp, Donaldson 
Lufkin Jenrette, First Boston, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley.  All other sample LBOs 
are classified as other.  These include LBOs organized  entirely by management  and by less 
well-known LBO  partnerships. To the extent that some of the LBOs classified as 'other are 
sponsored  by less well-known LEO partnerships,  this classification distinguishes  between the 
less well-known and the larger,  better-known LBO  sponsors. 
Panel A of table 9 shows the current private /  public status  of LEO companies  by 
type  of LEO  investor. A lower percentage  of the LUOs arranged  by LEO partnerships, 18 
52.3%,  are currenLlv privaLe;  the percentage of  LUOs arranged by merchant banks that are 
currently private,  72.7%, is similar to Lhe  65.6% for  all others.  The 523% for the LEO 
4 
partnerships  is dtfferent from the 66.9% for the other two groups at the 10% level (chi- 
square statistic = 2.96 with one degree of freedom).  Although not presented, this difference 
remains in a logit regression that controls for the year of LEO completion.  This Stiggesls 
that LBOs arranged by LBO partnerships are somewhat  less likely to be permanent. 
5.2  Divisions vs. public companies. 
LBOs of divisions may be driven by the same underlying  causes  as LEOs of public 
companies.  However, there are reasons thaL divisional LEOs might have different 
motivations  from those for LBOs of public companies.  First, it is possible that managers in 
LEOs of  public companies  use their private information to purchase the company at a price 
below its true value  The gains in these LBOs  come from information advantages rather 
than from any superiority  of organizational  form.  The information differences  between 
divisional managers and parent-company  managers are arguably  smaller  than those between 
public company managers and the stock market.  If such differences  are important, public 
companies should return to public ownership  more often. 
Alternatively,  it is possible that divisional buyouts have a greater need  for capital. 
One common reason for divestitures  is that the divested division is not part of the parent 
company's  core business.7  This suggests that the parent may have  ignored (or been  unhappy 
with) the division's operations.  IL  seems plausible that these divisions will have valuable 
investment  projects that the parent company  previously prevented them from pursuing. 
Accordingly,  divisional LI3Os would  be more likely return to public ownership  than LBOs  of  4 
See Kaplan  and Weisbach  (1990). 19 
public companies.8 
Panel B of table  9 presents the current private I public status of both divisional 
14 
and public company LBOs.  Almost exactly the same fraction  of divisions and public 
comparnes,  62.2% and 63.8%,  are still privately owned.  Again, the result is the same in logit 
regressions  that control for the  LBO completion year.  This suggests that LBOs, whether of 
divisions or public companies,  are motivated by similar forces. 
5.3  The importance of size. 
As the market value of equity owned  by undiversiried LBO equity owners 
increases,  the risk-bearing  costs of these holdings also increase. The higher these  costs  are, 
the more likely should be the LBO company's  return to public ownership. Similarly, a LBO 
company  may require access Lo public equity markets to finance future investment  after 
desired organizational changes are implemented under the LBO  organization.  It is probable 
that risk-bearing costs as  well as the need to ulttmately access public equity markets increase 
with the value of the LBO transaction. 
Panel C ol table 9 compares the current private / public status of LBOs valued at 
less than $300 million  to that of LBOs valued at $300 million or more.  Somewhat  more of 
the larger LBOs  -. 42.2% -- than the smaller LBOs -- 33.0% -- are currently publicly owned. 
The difference, however,  is not significant at conventional levels  (chi-square statistic = 148 
with one degree of freedom). 
In contrast, a logit regression  that controls for the year of buyout completion 
suggests that LBOs valued at more than $300 is apprrnimately 15%  more likely (significant 
at the 5% level) to be publicly owned as of  August 1990.  If, however,  transaction value or its 
log  replaces the $300 million  transaction  value dummy in the logit regressions,  the coefficient 
This is not entirely satisfactory  because parent  companies  presumably  could have divested 
the divisions by spinning them off to public shareholders. 20 
becomes insignificant (although it remains negative). These mixed results suggest that risk- 
bearing costs play a moderate role in determining the public or private status  of LBOs. 
5.4  Differences in likelihood of  returnice  to public ownership. 
The results in the previous subsections  show that the current public / private staLus 
of divisional LBOs is similar La  Lhat for public company  and divisional LEOs while LHOs 
organized by ISO partnerships and larger LBOs are more likely to be publicly owned. 
Because  they are based on the  reduced  form" current organizational status,  they may  not 
accurately reflect any differences in the timing of returning to public ownenhip 
Table 10 presents  the results of a logit regression  identical to regression  3 of table 
S except  that it includes LBO  partnership, division, and size variables. The estimates  confirm 
that LBOs arranged  by LBO  partnerships are more  likely to return to public ownership 
(sigatticant at the 5% level).  For example, in the second or later year after a larger public 
company  LBO, completed in 1986, the probability Lhe LBO will return to public ownership is 
11.4% if an LBO  partnership is involved, 7.3%  otherwise. 
The estimates  also suggest that divisional LBOs are more likely to return  to public 
ownership at some  point than LBOs of public companies  (significant at the 5% level).  For 
example,  in the second  or later year after a LBO completed in 1986, not involving a LBO 
partnership, the probability a larger divisional LBO will  return to public ownership is 14.7% 
compared to 7.3%  for a public compaay  LBO. 
At first glance.  it is punling that the likelihood of returning to public ownership is 
greater for divisions than for public companies  while the percentage  of LBOs  that are 
currently private does not differ for the two groups.  Part of this difference occurs  because 8 
of the 12 L130s that  go private after returning public were divisional LBOs.  Part may  also 
be explained by the fact that relatively fewer of the divisional LBOs were completed in the 
early 1980s. 21 
The finding that divisional [SOs return to public ownership more quickly than 
public company  LEOs is not consistent  with public company managers profiting from 
information  advantages.  The informational advantage  is arguably  smaller in divisional LBOs 
than in public company [SOs.  In contrast, the result is consistent  with divisional LEGs 
having a greater need for capital. 
Finally, LUOs valued  at $300 million or  greater at the time of the LEO are 
significantly more  likely to return to public ownership  Lhan LEGs valued at less than $300 
million.  For example,  in the second or later  year after a public company LEO not involving 
a LBO partnership, compLeted in 1986. the probability a larger LEO witl return to pubtic 
ownership is 7.3% compared to 1.9% for  a smaller LEO valued  at less than $300 million. 
This is consistent  with thc costs of risk-bearing and the need to access public equity markeLs 
being  higher for larger LEOs. 
6.  Conclusion. 
This paper has documented the organizational  status over time of large leveraged 
buyouts (LEGs) completed between 1979 and 1986.  Overall, the paper gives some support 
to both the Rappaport and to the Jensen  (and tax) views of leveraged  buyouts. 
As of  August 1990, 63% of the LEGs are privately owned,  14% are independent 
public companies,  and 23% are owned by other public companies.  As time since  the LEO 
increases,  the (unconditional) percentage  of LEOs that have returned to public ownership 
increases.  The hazard or the likelihood of returning to public ownership conditional on 
being private is small in the Iirst  year and appears  to be larger and constant thereafter.  The 
4  (unconditional) median time an LEO remains private equals  6.70 year&  Consistent  with 
Rappaport, the LEO  appears to be a transitory organizational form.  Although they are not 
permanent,  the majority of LEO organizations  are not short-lived. 
Private ownership is not Lhe only distinguishing  characteristic of a LEO 22 
organization.  The paper also considers  post-buyout independence,  leverage,  and equity 
ownership. The results suggest an important, but moderate role for asset sales to strategic 
buyers in 120s. Fewer than 32% of the original LBO  assets are owned  try companies  with 
other operating assets.  Because some of these buyers  might be in unrelated  businesses and 
because  asset purchases are not counted, 32% is an upper bound on the percentage  of assets 
that can  be owned by strategic buyers.  The actual  percentage  is undoubtedly lower.  This is 
much lower than the 72% reported by Bhagat et al. for three years after hostile takeovers 
and somewhat  lower Than the 43% reported for  the 7 LBOs in their sample.  In contrast to 
those results for hostile takeovers,  the results  for LBOs  are consistent with Jensen's view that 
incentives  play a role in esplaining the gains in LilOs. 
LBOs that remain privately owned LBOs, both independent and purchased, 
maintain debt levels similar to the levels when the LBO was completed.  In contrast, publicly 
owned LBOs, both independent and purchased,  maintain debt levels lower than the initial 
LBO  levels, but higher than pre-buyout levels  and median public company  levels.  The 
independent public LBOs also appear  to maintain relatively concentrated equity ownership. 
These results seem broadly consistent  with important roles for incentives  and tax benefits, 
Further evidence  is reported on the cross-sectional  determinants of the private / 
public status of LBOs.  120s arranged by LBO  partnerships  appear to be less permanent 
than LBOs arranged by othert  The former  are somewhat  more likely to be publicly owned 
than the latter group of LBOs.  At the same time,  larger LBOs  and divisional LUOs appear 
to return to public ownership more quickly than LBOs of  public companies.  This suggests 
that LBO partnerships, larger LBOs, and divisional LBOs have a greater need for liquidity 
and (or  access to  equity capital. 
It is worth noting that this paper describes  the experience  of LBOs completed 
before 1987.  Most ot these LBOs are followed by a growing economy in the first few post- 23 
buvout years.  In contrast, many of the LBOs completed after 1986 have to contend with a 
weakening  economy and, possibly less favorable stock and bond markets. At the same time, 
Kaplan and Stein (1991) present evidence that buyout prices and financial structures are 
more aggressive in 1986 to 1988 than in earlier years.  The effect of the increase in deal 
aggressiveness  and the weakening economy in 1990 on the organizational  experience of LBOs 
is an open and interesLing question. 24 
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Current  ownership  status of parent  company by  year of completion  for  183 leveraged buyouts  valued at more 
han SlOl million and completed  in  the period 1979-1986. 







Slams  PereenL 
Known  Publicly 
Owned 




Aug.  19g0 
1979 
1980 
5  0  0  5  40.0  60.0 
1981  II  0  0  11  45.5  54.5 
1982  13  1  0  12  50.0  50.0 
1983  16  1  2  13  69.2  3418 
1984  37  1  5  31  39.0  71.0 
1985  33  3  2  28  39.3  60.7 
1986  68  6  0  62  29.0  71.0 
1979- 
1983 
45  2  2  41  53.7  46.3 
1984- 
1986 
138  10  7  121  31.4  68.6 
All 
Deals 




'Sample  of evemged buvouts identified  as leveraged buvouls by either  Securities DaIs Corporation  or Morgan 
Stanley. 
A btyout's status is not  known if  we  could  not contact the company or hnd any information about  rho 
company. 
A buvout  is considered a  public entiw if  (1) it has issued equity to the public and is itill  a public company 
as of Aug. 30, 1990  or (2) a majority of the buyout company assets has been purchased by and is still owned 
by any public  company,  both domestic  and foreign. 
A  beynut  is considered a private entity if the majority of the assets of the buvout  company are still privately 
owned, either by the buyout company or by a subsequent private buyer. 
p Table 2 
Estimated current ownenhip  status of average company assets by year  o(aimpletion of 166  leveraged buvouLs 
•  valued ac more than Sl)  million and  completed  in  the period  1979-1986. 
Year  Number 
UBOs 








5  40.0  60.0 
1981  11  42.7  57.3 
1982  12  52.2  47.8 
1983  13  75.4  24.6 
1984  33  38.4  61.6 
t985  30  42.6  57.4 
1986  62  29.0  71.0 
1979. 
1983 
41  55.2  44.8 
1984— 
1986 
125  34.7  65.3 
All 
Deals 
166  39.9  60.1 
Sample of  leversEed buvouta identified  as leveraged ho  outs by either  Secuntim  Data Corporation  or Morgan 
Stanley.  Twelve of 183 LBOs  are excluded bemuse we could not contact  the company or find any information 
about  the company.  - 
Assets of  a buvout  company are considered public if  they are owned  by a publicly  owned company us of Aug. 
30. 1990.  This column  measurra the average fraction of  company assets public for all LBOs completed  in the 
given period. 
Assets of a huyouc company  are considered  private if they are still privately owned,  either by thc buvssut 
company or by a subsequent private buyer  as of Aug.  30,  1990. This column measurm the average traction 
of company assets public for all LBOs completed  at she given period. Table 3 
Ownemhip status of parent  company by age of leveraged huiout For  171  leveraged buyouls csluni at more  than 
S1  million and completed  in  the period  1919-1986. 
Age of LBO  Total LBOs Status 
Known at Year P 
Percant  Fercant 
Publicly Ownedi  Privately  Owned 
Year 1  171  2.9  97.1 
Year 2  169  14.8  85.2 
Year 3  168  24.4  75.6 
Year 4  135  32.6  61.4 
Year  5  36.0  64.0 
Year 6  63  39.7  60.3 
Year 7  38  44.7  55.3 
Year 8  23  47.8  512 
Year 9  7  28.6  71.4 
Year 10  4  0.0  1.0 
• 
Sample of leveraged buyouis  identified  as evenged  biivouts by  either  Securities Data Corporation  or Morean 
Stanley.  Twelve  of 83  LBOs are  excluded  beeaiase  we  could  not contact  the company or find any inlormaiion 
about the company.  Year i  is the end of year i after the buyout. 
A buyout is considered a public entity if  (1) it has issued equity to the public and is still a public  company; 
or (2) a majority of the  buyout company assets has been purchased  by  and is  still  owned  by any  public 
company, both domratic and foreign i yeats after the  buyout. 
A buyout  is considered a pnvate  entity if the majority  of the assets of the buyout  company  are still  privately 
owned,  either by the buyout company  or by a subsequent private  hinter i yeats after the buyouc. Table  4 
Percentage of L.BOs that return to public ownership  by age of levetaged buvout or 162 leveraged buvouts 





Private  at 
















Year I  162  6  0  96.3  3.7 
Year 2  156  20  0  84.0  16.0 
Year3  136  17  0  73.5  26.5 
Year 4  119  16  26  62.8  372 
Year5  77  7  25  56.2  43.8 
Year6  45  3  13  511  1 
Year 7  29  1  10  49.3  50.7 
Year 8  18  I  6  46.6  53.4 
Year9  11  0  6  46.6  53.4 
Year 10  5  0  1  46.6  53.4 
Year 11  4  1  3  35.0  65.0 
LEOs private at beginning  of year i include  those LBOs that (1) have not yet  returned  to some form of 
public  ownership;  and (2) were completed  more  than i-I years earlier.  Includes only those  162 LOOs  whose 
organintional status is known for all post-buvout  years. 
A buvout  is considered  a public entity if  (I) it has issued equity to the public and is still a public  company; 
or (2) a  majority of the  buvout company  assets has  been purchased by and ts  still owned  by any  public 
company. both domcsttc  and foreign i years after the buyout. 
LBOs  censored are  LBOs that (1) were completed  between i-I and i years earlier and (2) are ttill private as 
of August  1990. 
The cumulative  scrawl rate,  S(t), or product limit estimate equala: 
S(t1)  =  'k1 
1  - d / n) 
where d5 is the number  of LBOs  that return public at I] and ii, is the number  of LBOs that have II) not vet 
retumed  public just prtor to t and (2) were  completed  as least t1 years before.  The cumulative  failure rate. 
- S(tJ),  is the estimated  fraction  of LBOa that have returns to public ownership t  ycsrs  utter completing  art 
LBO. Table  5 
Logit regresainna of the probability  of returning 10  public ownership  conditional  on being  privately  owned  as 
a function of the tinte from the LBO and of the LBO completion  year for 162 leveraged buyouts  valued  at 
more than St  million and  completed  in the period  1979-1986. (Asymptotic t-ttatiStiea are in parcnthctcs.) 
Dependent  Variable Equals  1  if LBO company returns  to public  ownership  in  given year  conditional  on being 
private at beginning of year. 0 othenMie. 
Cl)  (2)  I  (3) 
Coeft  SE  Coeff.  St  I  Coeff.  SE 
Constant  -3.26'  042  -3.26'  042  -3.45'  0.47 
2nd  yea?  126'  048 
3rd  year  t.30'  0.49 
4th year  1,44'  0.51 
5th year  198  0.60 
6th year  1.1510  0.67 
7th year  1.01  0.85 
8th year  0.86  1.12 
9th year and  later  0.%  1.13 
2nd  year  and later  1.261  0.44  1.31'  0.44 
1981  and earlier'  -0.22  0.44 
1982  0.15  0.47 
1983  07810  0.44 
1984  -0.02  0.39 
1985  0.59  0.39 
N Ohs.  688  682  688 
Log Likelihood  -217.9  -218.4  -215,0 
The ia year variables  are dummy  variables  equat to one if the company-year  observation  is for the  year 
after the LBO and equal to zero othenvise.  The 9th year  and later (2nd year and later) variablea equal one 
if  the company-year  observation  is for the 9th year or later (2nd year  or later) after the LBO and  equal to zero 
otherwise. 
The variables  1982 to  t985 equal one if  the LBO  10 completed  in  thaI year and zero otherwise.  The  1981 
and earlier  variable  equals one for LBOs completed  1981 and  earlier. 
O Signilitant at the  1% level;  Signifleant  at the 5% level;  "  Sigttifleant  at the  10% level. Table 6 
Number and ownership  status as of  Aug. 1990  of 162 leveraged buyouls  valued at more  than  SlOG million  and 














































































41  22  8  14  19  16  3  41.4% 
1984- 
1926 
121  33  14  24  83  79  4  23.1% 
All 
Dcals 











Sample of  leveraged buyouls identified as leveraged buvouts by either Securitius Data Corpomlion or Morgan 
Stanley.  locludm only those  162 LBOs whose organizational status  ts known for all post-buvout Years. 
A buyout is considered a public entity if (I) it  has issued equity to the public and is still a public COmpanY  as ol Aug. 30, 1990 or (2) a majority of the buvout company assets has been purchased by and is still owned 
by any public company, both dommtic and foreign. 
A huvout is considered a private entity if the majority or the asaels of the buvout company are still privately 
owned, etther  by the buvout company or by a tubsequent  private buyer. 
A buyout's  status is not known if we could not contact the  company or  find any information about  the 
company. Table I 
Estimated  percentage  of company  assets  owned  by independent  compani  compared LO company assets owned 
by other companies  by year of completion of 165  leveraged bu ouls valued at more tban Sill] million and 
completed in  the period  1979.1986. 












5  80.0  20.0 
1981  U  63.6  36.4 
1982  I2  58.3  41.7 
1983  13  40.0  60.0 
1984  33  671  32.3 
1985  30  59.7  40.3 
1986  61  80.5  19.5 
All 
Deals 











• Sample of  leveraged buyouts identified as leveraged buyouts by either Securities Data Corporation  or Morgan 
Stanley. Twelve  of 183 LBOs are excluded beause we could not contact rIse company or find any  information 
about  the company  The current independence oF an additional six LBOs could not be delennined, 
Assets or a buvout  company are considered public if 01ev are owned by a publicly owned company as of Aug. 
30. 1990.  This column measures the average fraction of company usda public for all LBOs completed in  he 
given period. 
Assets oF a buvout company are considered private if they are still privately owned, either by the buyout 
company or by a subsequent privale buyer as of Aug. 30,  1990.  This column measures the average fraction 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 9 
PubLic or private status ol (1) buvouls arranged by LEO specialists, inveelment banks, and all othert (2) 
divisional and public  company buyouts  and (3)  larger  and smaLler buyouls as of Aug.  1990 for 183 leveraged 
buouts valued  at more 'ban S1  million and cempieted  in the period  1979-1986. 
Total  Status 
Unknown 
or liquidated 
as of Aug. 
19% 
Status Known 








as of Aug.  1990 
Pane! A 
LEO Parcnershtp  50  6  44  47.7  52.3 
Merchant Bankb  24  2  22  27-3  12.7 
All other,  09  13  %  34.4  65.6 
Panel B: 
Division  13  82  37.8  62.2 
Public Company  88]  8  80  36.2  63.8 
Panel C: 
Under  S34Y3 M  103  12  91  33.0  67.0 
Atleast$3(M  80  9  71  42.2  57.8 
All Bevoum  183  f_21 
162  37.0  r63.0 
LEO partnemhipt  LObs are [.EOs  arranged by Adler  Shaykin.  Clayton  Dubilier, Forstmann  Little,  Gibbons 
Green. Hicks &  I-has, Kelao,  Kohlberg  Kravis Roberts,  Riordan  Freeman. Thomas  Lee, Warburg  Pincus, and 
Weatsy. 
Merchant Bank LEOn are LObs arranged by Allen & Company, Bankers Truss, Citicorp, Donaldson  Lulkin 
Jenrette,  First baton,  Merrill Lynch, and  Morgan  Stanley. Table 10 
Logit regreasions of the probabiliLy  of  returning to public ownership  condiLional  on being privately  owned as 
a function of  division or public  company status, preaence of LEO partnership,  LEO sian, time from the LEO 
and year of LBO completion for 162 leveraged buyouta valued  at more than 81(i) million and completed  in 
the period  1979-lYSt (Asymptotic  t-statiatits  ale in parentbaa.) 
Dependent  variable equals  1 if  LEO company returns 
to public ownership  in given year conditional  on being 
private at beginning  of year 0 otherwise. 
(1) 
Coeff.  S.F. 
Constant 
LEO Partnership'  049"  0.30 
Division'  0.78'  .2!..._ 
At least S303 M'  1401  045 
2od year and latet4  0.501a  0.30 
1981 and earlier  -0.32  0.46 
1982  0.72  0.53 
1983  1.15'  0.47 
1984  0.17  0.41 
1985  0.64  0.40 
N Ohs,  688 
Log Likelihood  .212.9 
'The LEO partnership  variable  equals one if  the LEO is arranged by  an LED partnership  and  zero othersite. 
The division variable  equals  one if the LEO company  is a division of another company and zero  if it it a 
public  company  before  the LEO. 
'The  at least  $300 M variable  equals one if the LEO transaction  value is at least 8300 million. 
The 2nd  year and later  variable  equals one if the company-year observation  is for the 2nd  year or later alter 
the LEO and  equal to zero otherwise. 
- The variablea  1982 to  1985 equal one if  the LEO is completed  in  that year and zero otherwise.  The 1981 
and earlier variable  equals  one for LBOs  completed  1981 and  earlier. 
SignifIcant  at the  1% level;  Significant  at  the 5%  level:  '° Significant  at the  10% level. 